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obsession with the power of language gives rise in an elegant memoir.5 It
strikes me as superstitious to hold that human linguistic behavior has
power over the existence of theological realities. If such a magical view of
the power of human language is a consequence of the doctrine of the ontological priority of the social, then we have what I take to be a conclusive
reason to reject that doctrine.
In sum, this collection of papers provides a window on a conversation
about theory and methods in religious studies. When I look through this
window, I see some interesting lore about religion and religious studies,
but I do not not see much that would be valuable to philosophers of religion whose primary disciplinary affiliation is philosophy.
NOTES
1. Richard Rorty, “Religion in the Public Square: A Reconsideration,”
Journal of Religious Ethics 31.1 (2003), p. 142.
2. Charles Taylor, Varieties of Religion Today (Cambridge and London:
Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 59.
3. Ibid., p.60.
4. For details, see William P. Alston, Perceiving God (Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press, 1991), especially Chapter 4, “A ‘Doxastic Practice’
Approach to Epistemology.”
5. Alice Kaplan, French Lessons (Chicago and London: University of
Chicago Press, 1993).

Christianity and Western Thought. Volume II: Faith and Reason in the 19th
Century, by Steve Wilkens and Alan G. Padgett. Downers Grove:
InterVarsity Press, 2000. Pp. 436. $30.00 (cloth).
ROBERT ROBERTS, Baylor University
Of their accessible history of 19th century ideas Wilkens and Padgett say,
“As an overview for students, our book is primarily a survey. Our purpose is to introduce the major figures in Western thought, primarily
philosophers, from a Christian perspective” (p.9). Chapters 2 and 5 and
the last two chapters (totalling about 150 of the 370 pages of text) are
devoted to theologians and social scientists. A distinctive mark of this history is its preoccupation with Christianity. The authors are particularly
interested in the religious views of the philosophers, poets, and social scientists they canvass, and seek to show how these interact with the authors’
(other) central views. After the discussion of each author’s ideas, they offer
a brief critical assessment and / or estimation of the author’s importance.
Their assessments strike me as fair, and as not reflecting any very particular or sectarian theological viewpoint. Often they simply report the main
criticisms that have been offered in the literature.
Another distinctive mark, as indicated in the title, is the theme of reason
or rationality, the nature of which is a very live question at or just below
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the surface of virtually every thinker discussed, though the thinkers do not
always make the analysis of the concept an explicit theme, but instead, like
the rest of us, simply employ the concept as though it is univocal, normative, and everyone knows what it is. While Wilkens and Padgett speak
about authors’ concepts of reason and signal some differences among
them, it seems to me that they would have done well to intensify their
analysis, in the interest of historical precision and accuracy.
The title of the first substantive chapter (Chapter 2) is “Expanding
Rationality.” It is about European Romanticism and American
Transcendentalism as movements of rebellion against the Enlightenment’s
cold (emotion-excluding) and narrow (intuition-excluding) conception of
reason as the road to knowledge and right practice. But the rebellion does
not necessarily “expand rationality” conceptually; for example, Hamann is
quoted as saying that “faith arises just as little from reason as tasting and
seeing do” (26); the idea is that faith is not rational, but arises from “intuition.” But if we think of reason as a set of procedures, rules, or habits of
mind that are correct or normative, either epistemically or practically, and
if we think of faith as getting us in touch with some reality, then we should
really “expand rationality” by including “intuition” or the emotional side of
our nature in it; and then faith becomes a way of being rational. Coleridge,
unlike Hamann, really does expand rationality when he makes the primary
imagination “the vital capacity of reason” (p.44). Through this epistemological move he can hold that “Christianity is the apex of rationality” (ibid.).
By contrast Schleiermacher, the other main “Romantic” theologian treated
in Chapter 3, is inclined to maintain a strict division between the rational
and the experiential (affective, intuitive, subjective) (p.60). Religion
belongs to the latter part of the mind, and what appears to be rational in
religion (theology) is really the (non-cognitive?) expression of the affective
(the feeling of absolute dependence).
Chapters 4 through 6 are about Hegelian idealism, its immediate
predecessors, and its theological, as well as anti-theological, heirs. Like the
Romantics and Transcendentalists, Hegel advocates a philosophy expansive enough to encompass religion; indeed, he regards himself as a
Christian philosopher. He wishes to overcome the dichotomy between the
divine and the human, between the thing-in-itself and our experience of it.
But in doing so, he reaffirms the dichotomy of reason versus intuition. As
Wilkens and Padgett comment, idealism “retained an allure for [professional] philosophy [that Romanticism lacked] by attempting to build on
rationality rather than intuition” (p.63, italics added). Yet the kind of reason
that Idealism sponsored did not, as in the earlier modern concept, avoid
the subjective in the interest of objectivity; instead, it made the exploration
of the subject of thinking, and in particular the evolution of this subject, the
source and explanation of objectivity. The “subject” here is, however, no
longer the individual human being, but a sort of anonymous, generalized
spirit called “the Absolute.” Hegel is a “dialectical” thinker, thus for him
“each particular truth is only partial” (p.79). Each particular truth cannot
be fully understood except in virtue of a “location” in a system of thought,
and that location has an evolutionary temporality, that is, the truth belongs
(having its meaning and truth) at a certain place in the process of dialectic.
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Thus Hegelian idealism both adds to and subtracts from earlier concepts of
reason. It adds to the systematicity that seems to be characteristic of virtually any concept of reason (which must, it seems, at least have a place for
the grounding of some truths in other truths); it adds a historical or evolutionary dimension that is absent from the static conceptions of reason in
earlier modern philosophy; it adds subjectivity, though it also revokes this
by making it equivalent, after the dialectical evolution, with objectivity;
and from a conception of reason like that of Coleridge it subtracts the individual thinker, with his emotional intuitions.
In the christology of his Life of Jesus, David Friedrich Strauss picks up
especially on the dialectical and historical features of Hegel’s concept of
reason. In his view, the church faces a dilemma: we must acknowledge
that the New Testament is fiction while affirming that God was in Christ
reconciling the world to himself. The solution is to see that the representation of Jesus as the God-man is a mythological anticipatory proxy for the
conceptual reconciliation of the divine and the human that is the necessary
outcome of reason’s evolution. Strauss’s teacher Ferdinand Christian Baur
applies the dialectical and evolutionary conception of reason to all history.
“The historian can be equal to his task only in so far as he transposes himself into the objective reality of the subject matter itself, free from the bias of
subjective views and interests, whatever they may be, so that instead of
making history a reflection of his own subjectivity, he may be simply a
mirrior for the perception of historical phenomena in their true and real
form” (p.104). And what he sees in history when so “transposed” by reason is, again, the absolute Idea, the objective unity of the divine and the
human, the universal and the particular.
For Hegel as for the ancient philosophers, reason seeks unity and synthesis, and that unity is a divine quality; one might say that in the Hegelian
dialectic, the divine dominates the human, spirit dominates matter. But in
the next generation of Hegelians, represented by Feuerbach and Marx, the
order of domination is reversed. Idealism becomes humanism and materialism. Feuerbach turns God into a human projection, a misconstrued image
of the human species: “Every God is a creature of the imagination, an
image, and specifically an image of man, but He is an image which man
places outside himself and conceives of as an independent being” (p.118).
To make something outside ourselves ultimate for ourselves is to slight ourselves as material beings: “Because we are not solely rational, but feeling
and volitional beings, Idealism alienates us from ourselves” (p.122). The
solution is a humanism in which humanity becomes our God (not: God
becomes a man). But we might also have said that since feeling and volition
are so important to us, taking them properly into consideration is our only
rational course. Again, the conceptual scope of reason is negotiable.
In all the permutations of reason in the 18th and 19th centuries, rationality is intimately related to truth: reason is a way — sometimes the
only way — of arriving at truth. So the rational and the real must be partially or wholly isometric, if not identical. In Karl Marx, the rational
seems to leap out of the mind and into the material world, if somewhat
hesitantly. The Hegelian dialectic is “inverted” (to use Wilkens’ and
Padgett’s term), the conflicts and their resolutions being not between
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ideas but between social classes as defined economically. Ideas no longer
drive, but now merely reflect, material conditions, and religious ideas are
no exception. Christianity is just a factor by which one economic class
keeps another in its place.
Chapter 7, “Rebellion Against Rationality,” presents Schopenhauer,
Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche as dissenters from “the tide of optimism
found in Romanticism and Idealism.” “At the heart of their protest
against a positive evaluation of human existence is a rejection of reason”
(p.145). For Schopenhauer, the will to live is the essence of the human
being, and this will is utterly distinct from the intellect. The human will
is part of the blind will found throughout nature, which because of death
is always doomed to frustration. Human reason applies only to the
rather superficial world of phenomena, not the real world, which is
essentially futile will. Padgett and Wilkens uncritically pass on the textbook tradition that Kierkegaard is “the father of…existentialism” (p.156)
and an irrationalist who “revels in the irrationality of [Christianity’s] doctrines” (p.165). Despite some of the items in their long bibliographical
footnotes, they seem to be unaware of the work of Steve Evans and
Merold Westphal on Kierkegaard’s concept of rationality and of recent
scholarship showing that Kierkegaard’s thought is quite distant from —
even diametrically opposed to — that of the paradigm existentialists of
the 20th century. Since Wilkens and Padgett show awareness of the contestability of the concept of rationality, one might have expected them to
give a more nuanced account of Kierkegaard’s place in 19th century
thought, especially considering that he is one of the few major thinkers of
that century who was an orthodox Christian. Despite its brilliance,
Nietzsche’s thought is a bit chaotic, so one may wonder whether he has a
consistent view about rationality. But one discernible theme is that since
in all our actions, including our intellectual practices, we humans are
seeking power, and since interpretation is an unavoidable fact of intellectual life (there being no such thing as facts which by their bruteness compel assent), truth is a fiction and the world is just whatever the strong
construe it to be in our imaginative quest for personal power. In history,
for example, “events are created by those who successfully win the right
through strength to tell the story in a way that is advantageous to them”
(p.172). This does come pretty close to being an abandonment of theoretical reason, though a bit of practical reason remains: the will to power
lends a certain “logic” to interpretation.
Concepts of rationality can also differ in scope of ascribed competency. Chapter 8 — “A Rational Society” — features chiefly Auguste Comte
and John Stuart Mill. Like many 19th century thinkers (Hegel, Marx,
Kierkegaard), Comte posits developmental stages, and the development
he posits is toward greater rationality, by way of reducing what we
expect from it. The three stages are the theological, the metaphysical,
and the scientific. Like the more familiar positivists of the 20th century,
Comte thinks that reason is not competent to answer metaphysical questions; the intellectually mature will trust only science for truth. The highest of the sciences is sociology (the name of which Comte invented), and
Comte designs an entire society as directed by this science, complete with
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its own scientific religion with nine sacraments! Mill, who was very
interested in the philosophy of Comte and worked for its dissemination
in England, disagrees with Comte in a number of particulars but largely
shares his concept of rationality. He tries to stick to an anti-metaphysical,
strictly empiricist epistemology in which even logical truths are empirical
generalizations.
In Chapter 9 the scene shifts from Europe to America, except for a
quick look at F. H. Bradley. The main characters are Charles Peirce and
William James. Josiah Royce puts in a brief appearance; he and Bradley
are treated with respect, but as the last gasps of Hegel’s spirit. According
to Peirce, the most rational way to fix beliefs is to test them fairly but rigorously and repeatedly in an intellectual community, with reference to
their observable results, in a very broad sense of “observable.” Peirce’s
“empiricism” differs from that of Comte and Mill in not excluding metaphysics; metaphysics too can have pragmatic value. One of Peirce’s
metaphysical positions is that the universe is becoming more law-abiding
as time goes by, and he sees in this an indication that something like
agape governs and is fundamental to the universe — indeed, that God
exists. James, with his more direct and colorful style, brings out more
clearly the broadmindedness of the pragmatist version of empiricism. To
be rational is not to be narrowly “intellectual,” but to consult the whole
range of considerations that bear on belief-formation. “Pretend what we
may, the whole man within us is at work when we form our philosophical opinions. Intellect, will, taste, and passion co-operate just as they do
in practical affairs” (p.228). The case of the American pragmatists suggests that even a concept of rationality that contains a rule against going
beyond the observable allows of variation in terms of what counts as
observable.
In this review I have concentrated on just one aspect of Wilkens’ and
Padgett’s book, though it is an important aspect that they themselves
stress. In a very schematic way, I have brought out more clearly than
they do the variety of concepts of rationality that are put forward in 19th
century thought, though in doing so I have not gone beyond the data
provided in their text. It seems to me that they could have improved
their book, without sacrificing its accessibility and classroom usefulness,
by doing a bit more philosophical analysis in this area. The ninth chapter is devoted to theological movements such as the Oxford Movement,
the Mercersberg theology, the Princeton theology, and German liberalism. The last chapter is about Darwin and such thinkers as Herbert
Spencer, Émile Durkheim, Max Weber, and Sigmund Freud. Another
feature of the book that makes it attractive as a course text is the short
biographical sketches that precede the accounts of authors’ ideas.
InterVarsity Press could have done a better job of editing; the book contains too many misspellings, typographical errors, awkward sentences,
and misused words.

